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[Below are selected highlights from an interview conducted by a Central American and Caribbean
research group based in Managua, of Guadalupe Martinez, a commander of the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front (FMLN). The interview took place in April, and was published in June
by Pensamiento Proprio. (Pensamiento Proprio is a publication of the Regional Coordination for
Economic and Social Research of Central America and the Caribbean-CRIES, Managua.)] PP: What
is the FMLN's interpretation of the March 20 elections? Martinez: The results of the legislative and
municipal elections surprised everyone but the FMLN. In the four years under [President Jose]
Napoleon Duarte, our efforts have been aimed at showing that neither the Christian Democrats
(DC) nor any other force can carry out a successful counterinsurgency campaign. We need real
changes, not a democratic facade that serves only to continue the war. Our election boycott was
aimed at taking votes away from the Christian Democrats [Duarte's party]. ARENA's electoral base
went...to the polls, but the Christian Democrats' base frustrated by unfulfilled promises, internal
corruption, and the personal ambitions of its leaders , stayed at home. PP: You refer not to an
ARENA victory, but to a Christian Democrat defeat. Martinez: Exactly. ARENA's number of votes
did not increase compared to the last election. Only its percentage of total votes cast increased. The
number of votes cast for the Christian Democrats dropped significantly. The true winner of the
elections was abstentionism. The number of invalid ballots alone reached 108,000, more than the
total number of ballots received by the PCN [National Conciliation Party] which received 78,000
votes. The large number of abstentions does not mean that these voters are with us, but rather that
they do not believe in the elections and are searching for an alternative. The election figures also
give the lie to the idea that the people are moving to the right. The elections also brought on a crisis
within the Christian Democrat Party, and provoked a political and institutional conflict among
parties and the state powers. Installation of the Legislative Assembly was delayed for over a month.
How was it resolved? The ARENA oligarchy simply bought a PCN representative, ensuring them
an absolute majority in the Assembly. PP: What will the FMLN do under these circumstances?
Martinez: We believe that alternatives must be offered to the Christian Democrats' frustrated social
base in order to fill the political vacuum. Workers' organizations such as the Popular Democratic
Union (UPD) and the National Worker Peasant Union (UNOC), which supported Duarte in 1984,
and since have become critical of his government, may see an alternative in the platform of the
UNTS (Salvadoran Workers National Union). The UNTS could form a workers' front open to
all social groups focusing on immediate and common interests, where ideological questions are
not fundamental. For certain middle and professional classes which had previously voted for the
Christian Democrats, Ruben Zamora's MPSC (Popular Social Christian Movement) could be a
reasonable pole of attraction. Finally, support among these frustrated social sectors may increase
for the FMLN, above all among campesinos in zones of conflict or in areas where we are expanding
our influence. Obviously, this means broadened popular support for the negotiated political
solution advocated in different forms by the UNTS, MPSC, and FMLN. PP: So the FMLN's strategy
continues to be to seek a negotiated political solution to the conflict? Martinez: We are working
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on a proposal which goes beyond the one we formulated two years ago. This proposal has as a
principle that the solution must come from Salvadorans and affirm our self-determination in the
face of US intervention. Beginning from there, it will be easy to reach agreements and reforms on
the rest of the points. PP: Recently the FDR-FMLN sent an invitation to renew negotiations, not only
with the government, but with representatives of the Legislative Assembly and the Armed Forces.
Martinez: Until now the official talks have been organized for their propaganda value and tactical
considerations. Duarte wanted to appear in compliance with Esquipulas II. It is necessary to move
as soon as possible from talks to real negotiations. Otherwise, there is a risk that the population
will lose faith in the possibility of a political solution. Because of this, we invited the Legislative
Assembly which represents the new correlation of forces between the three parties. Duarte, his
party, and his government have lost authority and credibility. The Christian Democrats can no
longer be the only actor in negotiations with the FMLN. If the Legislative Assembly were present
in negotiations, we could discuss the constitutional reforms contained in our proposal. We want
to offer concrete advances toward the humanization of the war. For our side, that would mean
stopping economic sabotage, transportation boycotts, and the use of land mines. In exchange, we
would ask for the suspension of aerial bombing and the use of heavy artillery by the military. Duarte
refused this offer with the excuse that he would like a global agreement in which we unconditionally
disarm. His lack of willingness to negotiate is illustrated by his refusal to accept gradual and realistic
measures which are the only things we can agree on in the short-term in order to subsequently
move forward with negotiations. PP: The FMLN has called on all political and social sectors to
participate in a National Dialogue. How does this fit in with the official peace talks? Martinez: The
two are parallel, not mutually exclusive. An open National Dialogue can establish the elements
of consensus, provided that we all desire a negotiated political solution. This would facilitate the
evolution from dialogue to negotiation. PP: Is this why the Democratic Revolutionary Front's (FDR)
Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora have returned to El Salvador? Martinez: Their return has been
misunderstood. The FDR is talking with political and social forces that the FMLN does not have
access to, including ARENA. The FDR's role needs to be understood as part of a deployment of all
forces in our alliance. It is a correct move since it does not rule out either a political or a military
solution. We try to combine both to cover a broader spectrum of sectors of the population. PP:
Was the return of Ungo and Zamora decided jointly by the FDR-FMLN alliance? Martinez: The
FMLN never doubted that their return would strengthen the alliance, but clearly the decision
was the responsibility of each party. The difficulty was in handling two apparently contradictory
types of struggle armed and political. For us, however, armed struggle is an integral part of our
people's political struggle which is expressed on different levels. All our efforts are aimed at
moving towards a negotiated political solution to the conflict. The FMLN is not an army created
to defeat another army: this is a very simplistic vision of what revolutionary war is. Popular war
implies the incorporation of the entire population in a combination of different forms of struggle.
In this sense, we have had a political impact on all aspects of Salvadoran life. If we have taken up
arms, it is because we were obliged to, not because we want only an FMLN military victory. PP:
Nonetheless, many believe that the conditions for popular insurrection have expanded. Martinez:
Insurrection and a political solution are not counterposed to one another. We do not call on the
people to rise up now because we want to deepen the political struggle. But if in the short- or
medium-term, conditions leading to negotiations do not develop, credibility in a political solution
will be lost and the people's desperation may lead to spontaneous uprisings. I would like to give a
concrete example. The strategy of employers in El Salvador is to break strikes by wearing out the
workers. A boss will refuse to negotiate for 2 or 3 months, and when the workers are on the edge of
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desperation, he will offer an amount equal to 10 or 15% of the workers' salaries lost during the strike
in exchange for getting rid of the union. If the workers refuse, they would be fired. Whatever option
the worker chooses, he loses hope and his exasperation grows. The bosses temporarily resolve the
strike problem but create another problem infinitely larger. These are the bosses that create the
conditions within the culture medium for an eventual uprising. PP: With the crisis in government
and the possibility of uprisings, the Armed Forces have openly threatened a coup. Martinez: The
army could attempt a coup only with permission from the US ambassador. But this would make it
difficult for the US government to convince the liberal [wing of the] Democratic party to maintain
aid to El Salvador. This option would only be used in the event of a serious power vacuum. PP:
The Democratic Convergence, which includes two parties from the FDR, may participate in the
1989 presidential elections. What is the FMLN's position on this possibility? Martinez: We need to
consider this possibility because we are a political-military force in alliance with others who make
use of the available political channels and count on the possibility of participating in elections.
What we did in the last elections does not necessarily need to be repeated for the presidential
elections. We will see what happens in the next few months. If the US were to leave the conflict and
move towards a concrete possibility for a non-military solution somehow or another, and it stops
interfering, then the battle here will be strictly on political grounds. We must not forget that the
US imposed the military route on the FMLN. We do not fear a political struggle. In these years of
war we have gained a lot of organizational strength and experience, and we speak in a way seen
to be reasonable by important social groups in the Central American region. We believe that with
adequate guarantees and conditions we could participate in and win an electoral contest. To get
these guarantees, a national consensus is needed for a made-in-Salvador solution. We hope that
the Democrats win the US presidency and understand this. We have the hope that the next US
administration will not continue the same Reagan policy of militaristic solutions to our problem. For
this, as for electoral guarantees, support from the international community is essential.

-- End --

©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 3 of 3

